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O P I N I O N
                              
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a labor dispute
between Major League Baseball and its
umpires, the majority of whom resigned in
protest over what they viewed as
objectionable polic ies which the
Commissioner of Baseball sought to
implement during the 1999 season.
Although all of the resigning umpires
eventually attempted to rescind their letters
of resignation, the events that followed left
a substantial number of them unemployed.
The twenty-two unemployed umpires
subsequently filed grievances that were
submitted to an arbitrator. 
The District Court confirmed the
Arbitrator’s determination that the dispute
fell within the scope of the arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining
3agreement (CBA), and further confirmed
the Arbitrator’s disposition of the
grievances of nineteen of the umpires.  In
their appeals, both sides challenge the
confirmation of the portions of the Award
unfavorable to them.  In addition, the
Leagues contend that the dispute was not
arbitrable in the first instance.  For the
reasons stated below, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court. 
I. Factual Background
The Major League Umpires Association
(MLUA or Association) represents 
umpires employed by both the American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and
the National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs.  The American and
National Leagues together comprise what
is commonly referred to as Major League
Baseball (MLB).  Each League has its own
president, operates as a separate entity, and
employs its own umpires.  Generally
speaking, the Commissioner of Baseball
broadly oversees the operation of the
Leagues and participates in decisions
affecting the game as a whole.  However,
control over the employment and
discipline of umpires has historically
rested with the respective League
presidents. 
The dispute at issue arose during
the 1999 baseball season over what the
MLUA perceived as an attempt by the
Commissioner of Baseball, Allan H.
“Bud” Selig, to strip the League presidents
of supervisory power over umpires and to
c e n t r a l i z e  t ha t  p o w e r  i n  t h e
Commissioner’s Office.  Specifically, the
MLUA believed that Commissioner Selig
was attempting to implement various new
policies that violated the CBA between the
MLUA and the Leagues.1  
To resolve its disputes with the
Leagues, the MLUA attempted to force the
Leagues to negotiate with it over the
proposed new policies  by organizing a
mass resignation of its members.  The
MLUA apparently believed that, by
electing to pursue a mass resignation
strategy as opposed to a strike or other
form of work stoppage, it could avoid
violating the no-strike clause contained in
the CBA2 and force the Leagues to bargain
     1These policies included proposals to
(1) evaluate the consistency of individual
umpires’ interpretation of the strike zone;
(2) utilize a computerized “pitch
simulator” to improve umpire training;
(3) use MLUA umpires to officiate an
exhibition game to be played in Cuba
without engaging in separate negotiations
with the MLUA, as was purportedly the
traditional method of addressing issues
surrounding exhibition games; and (4)
enlist the aid of club general managers to
“chart” pitches in an effort to determine
whether umpires were properly
interpreting the------------------ strike
zone.  The MLUA viewed these
proposals as violations of the existing
CBA. 
     2The no-strike clause of Article XIX
of the CBA states, in relevant part, that
“the Association agrees that there shall
4because the voluntary resignation of its
members would trigger the Leagues’
obligation to pay the resigning umpires
approximately $15 million in severance
compensation.  Fifty-seven of the MLUA’s
sixty-eight members agreed to participate
in the mass resignation; twenty-three from
the American League and thirty-four from
the National League.  On July 15, 1999,
each of the resigning umpires sent a letter
to his respective League president stating
that he resigned his position effective
September 2, 1999.  Umpires with more
than ten years on the job also demanded
severance pay due under the CBA as a
result of voluntary termination.3  In
addition, each of the fifty-seven resigning
umpires executed a personal services
agreement with the newly created
Professional Umpire Services, Inc.  These
agreements stated, in relevant part, that the
umpire would render services “exclusively
for the Corporation and/or for the Person
with whom the Corporation agrees to
provide Umpire Services.” 
Articles of incorporation were filed
for Professional Umpire Services on July
9, 1999, but the company never
countersigned the personal services
agreements or conducted any business.  It
appears the MLUA planned to use the
company as a means of providing the
Leagues with umpiring services in the
event that the labor dispute was not
resolved by the time the resignations took
effect on September 2.
On July 22, Commissioner Selig
met with American League President Gene
Budig and National League President
Leon ard Coleman in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, in an effort to determine how
best to respond to the resignations.  After
some discussion, the Leagues decided not
to negotiate with the MLUA.  
There are conflicting versions of
what transpired at this meeting.  The
be no strike nor other concerted work
stoppage during the period of this
Agreement and further that it will use its
best efforts to cause each umpire
faithfully to carry out their obligations as
employees.”
     3The relevant portion of each letter
stated as follows:
Effective September 2,
1999, I hereby resign from
my employment from the
[American or National]
League pursuant to Article
VIII.D of the Basic
Agreement between the
American League of
Professional Baseball
Clubs, the National League
of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the Major
League Umpires
Association dated January
1, 1995.  [Where
applicable:]  I hereby
demand my voluntary
termination pay. 
5MLUA contends that there was no
immediate threat to the continuing
operation of MLB, as the resignations did
not become effective until several weeks
after the meeting.  It further argues that
Commissioner Selig essentially forced the
League presidents to begin hiring
replacement umpires in an effort to
manufacture a claim of detrimental
reliance and to break the union.  The
Leagues counter that they viewed the mass
resignation strategy as a violation of the
CBA’s “no-strike” clause, and therefore
began hiring replacement umpires to
ensure the continued operation of MLB
during the upcoming League playoffs and
World Series.
By the end of the day on July 22,
the Leagues had hired a total of twenty
replacement umpires (eight in the National
League and twelve in the American
League).4  As a result, it soon became clear
to MLUA members that the mass
resignation strategy was a failure.  Many
began to rescind their letters of
resignation.  Despite the capitulation of
some of its members, however, the MLUA
continued to exert pressure on the
Leagues.  On July 23, it filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania seeking to establish the
resigning umpires’ rights to termination
pay and benefits.
Through a combination of new
hires and resignation rescissions, the
American League returned to full staff by
July 26.  In contrast, relatively few
National League umpires had rescinded
their resignations as of that date, and
National League President Coleman hired
five more replacement umpires.  On July
27, the remaining thirty-two National
League and six5 American League umpires
attempted to rescind their resignations en
masse.  However, because of the new hires
and previous resignation rescissions, only
nineteen National League positions
remained open.  As stated above, all of the
American League positions had been filled
by that date
Because he had no positions left to
fill, American League President Budig
simply refused to allow any of the final six
American League umpires to rescind their
resignations.6  National League President
     4The District Court puts the number at
17 (8 in the NL and 9 in the AL). 
However, the Arbitrator found 12
replacements in the AL, and thus 20
overall.  As the Arbitrator was the fact-
finder in this case, we have adopted his
number.
     5The District Court listed the names of
seven AL umpires who tried to rescind
on July 27, but the Arbitrator put the
number at six.  Again, we have adopted
the Arbitrator’s number.
     6These umpires received a letter from
American League President Budig
stating, in relevant part:
On July 15, 1999, I
received from your union,
6Coleman faced a more difficult situation,
as he was forced to determine which of the
remaining thirty-two National League
umpires would be permitted to rescind
their resignations.  In order to make this
determination, he invoked Article VIII A
of the CBA, which provides in its second
paragraph that “[a]ll umpires shall be
selected or retained in the discretion of the
League Presidents on the basis of merit
and the skill of the umpire to perform to
Major League standards.”  Applying this
provision at least in part, Coleman selected
nineteen umpires from the thirty-two and
permitted those nineteen to rescind their
letters of resignation.  Coleman then
accepted the resignations of the remaining
thirteen National League umpires.
  By the end of this imbroglio,
twenty-two of the fifty-seven MLUA
members who participated in the mass
resignation scheme, nearly one-third of the
Association’s total membership, were
unemployed (nine from the American
the Major League
Umpires’
Association, a letter
from you dated July
14, 1999, resigning
from your
employment as an
umpire with the
American League.  I
deeply regret that
you decided to take
part in this
concerted
resignation plan
instigated by the
Major League
Umpires’
Association. 
However, you have
left me with no
choice but to accept
your resignation and
to fill the vacancy
that your resignation
has created along
with the other
vacancies that were
created by this mass
resignation strategy. 
The hiring process
is now complete. 
The American
League has hired a
permanent employee
to fill the vacancy
created by your
resignation and each
resignation
submitted by an
American League
umpire that was not
rescinded.
Thank you for your service
to the American League
and I personally wish you
the best in your future
endeavors.
7League and thirteen from the National
League).  All twenty-two of these umpires
filed grievances under the CBA.  
II. Procedural History
The MLUA filed its Demand for
Arbitration of the grievances on August
27, 1999.  On August 30, the MLUA
sought an injunction from the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to prevent the
Leagues from dismissing the twenty-two
umpires whose resignations had been
accepted and were due to take effect on
September 2.  The District Court held a
hearing on September 1.  Following this
hearing, the par ties executed a
Memorandum of Understanding stating
that the MLUA would withdraw its
complaint and that the parties would
submit the matter to an arbitrator.  The
Memorandum of Understanding also
permitted either side to “raise in such
arbitration whatever procedural and
substantive arbitrability arguments . . . the
parties may have.” 
In November 1999, the Leagues,
contending that the dispute at issue did not
fall within the scope of the CBA’s
arbitration provision, moved to dismiss the
grievances.  The Arbitrator denied this
motion on November 26, 1999.  Both sides
were represented by counsel during the
arbitration proceedings, which included
seventeen days of testimony over the
course of approximately one year. 
Following completion of the
proceedings, the Arbitrator issued his
Opinion and Award on May 11, 2001.  The
Arbitrator sustained the grievances and
ordered the reinstatement of two American
League umpires (Coble and Kosc), and
seven National League umpires (Darling,
Hohn, Tata, Pulli, Poncino, West, and
Vanover) with full back pay and benefits.
It denied the grievances of all of the
remaining American and National League
umpires.  Both sides subsequently filed
actions in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania seeking to vacate the
portions of the Award unfavorable to
them.  In addition, the Leagues challenged
the Arbitrator’s denial of their motion to
dismiss the dispute as non-arbitrable. 
    
     
The District Court held that the
Leagues had properly preserved their
objection to arbitrability.  It nevertheless
confirmed the Arbitrator’s conclusion that
the dispute was arbitrable.  As for the
merits of the parties’ arguments, the
District Court confirmed the Arbitrator’s
conclusion that the Leagues were entitled
to hire replacement umpires in reliance on
the letters of resignation submitted by the
grievants, as well as confirming his
determination that American League
President Budig was not required to accept
the six resignation rescissions submitted
on July 27 in view of the fact that the
American League was fully staffed by that
date. 
The District Court further
confirmed the Arbitrator’s application of
the Article VIII “merit and skill” criteria to
8the determinations made with respect to all
but three of the National League umpires,
and his decision, following this
application, to require the National League
to reinstate seven umpires (Darling, Hohn,
Tata, Pulli, Poncino, West, and Vanover)
who satisfied this criteria despite the fact
that all National League positions had
been filled.  Finally, the District Court
confirmed the Arbitrator’s conclusion that
three additional National League umpires
(Davidson, Gregg, and Hallion) need not
be reinstated because they failed to satisfy
the Article VIII merit and skill criteria.7
On appeal, both sides contend that the
District Court erred in confirming the
portions of the Award unfavorable to
them.  Additionally, the Leagues assert
that the dispute at issue does not fall
within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration
provision so that it was not arbitrable in
the first instance.
III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of
Review
The District Court reviewed the
Arbitrator’s Award pursuant to § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185.  We have
jurisdiction over the parties’ cross-appeals
of the District Court’s final order pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the
District Court’s ruling is plenary, and we
apply the same test applied by the District
Court.  Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Local
Union No. 272 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, AFL-CIO (Pennsylvania Power
II), 276 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV. Discussion
A.  Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards
We begin our analysis by
examining the general legal principles
governing federal courts’ review of
arbitration awards.  The first step in any
such review involves an examination of
the sources of the arbitrator’s authority.
See Matteson v. Ryder System, Inc., 99
F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, a district court
may vacate an arbitration award if, inter
alia, ‘the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.’”)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).  Simply
stated, “an arbitrator may not venture
beyond the bounds of his or her authority,”
which is defined not only by the terms of
     7The District Court also confirmed the
Award as to two American League
umpires (Coble and Kosc) and vacated
the portion of the Award that upheld the
National League’s discharge of three
other umpires (Nauert, Dreckman, and
Holbrook) with less than five years’
experience.  All five initially appealed
this ruling, but have since settled their
dispute.  Thus, their claims are no longer
before us, and we do not address them
here.
9the CBA, but also by the scope of the
issues submitted by the parties.  Id.  Thus,
“[i]t is the responsibility of the arbitrator in
the first instance to interpret the scope of
the parties’ submission, but it is within the
courts’ province to review an arbitrator’s
interpretation.”  Id. at 113.
In conducting this review, “‘the
deference that is accorded to an
arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement should also be
accorded to an arbitrator’s interpretation of
the issue submitted.’” Id. (quoting Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers
Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1982)).
This is so because (1) “a more searching
judicial review of submissions . . . would
undermine the congressional policy of
promoting speedy, efficient,  and
inexpens ive  resolu t ion  of  labor
grievances”; (2) “interpretation of a
submission must often occur in the context
of the collective bargaining agreement
itself ,”  thereby result ing  in  an
inconsis tency i f  the arbi t ra tor’s
interpretation of the CBA receives
deference but his or her determination of
the scope of the submission does not; and
(3) “requiring courts to engage in a close
examination of the submissions to
arbitrators would put a considerable strain
on judicial resources.”  Id. (citing Mobil
Oil, 679 F.2d at 302).     
Our role in reviewing the outcome
of the arbitration proceedings is not to
correct factual or legal errors made by an
arbitrator.
Courts are not authorized to
review the arbitrator’s
decision on the merits
despite allegations that the
decision rests on factual
errors or misinterprets the
parties’ agreement . . . .
When an arbitrator resolves
disputes regard ing the
application of a contract,
and no dishonesty is alleged,
t h e  a r b i t r a t o r ’ s
‘improvident, even silly,
factf inding’ does  not
provide a basis for a
reviewing court to refuse to
enforce the award.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v.
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).  We
should uphold an arbitration award that
“draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement” because “the
parties to the collective bargaining
agreement ‘bargained for’ a procedure in
which an arbitrator would interpret the
agreement.”  National Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal
Serv., 272 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting that a court should uphold an
arbitration award) (citing Eastern Assoc.
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531
U.S. 57, 62 (2000)); United Indus.
Workers v. Gov’t of the V.I., 987 F.2d
162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a
court may not “overrule an arbitration
decision because it finds an error of law”);
Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No.
1269, United Mine Workers of Am., 896
F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that,
10
because “the parties have bargained for the
arbitrator’s decision, ‘it is the arbitrator’s
view of the facts and of the meaning of the
contract that they have agreed to accept.
An award may fairly be said to “draw[] its
essence from the bargaining agreement if
the interpretation can in any rational way
be derived from the agreement, viewed in
light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties’ intention.”
United Transportation Union Local 1589,
51 F.3d at 379-80 (internal quotations
omitted). 
Moreover, an award may be vacated
if the arbitrator demonstrates manifest
disregard for the CBA.  See Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. Newark
Typographical Union Local, 797 F.2d 162,
165 (3d Cir. 1986).  Manifest disregard for
the CBA is established when the
arbitrator’s award is “‘totally unsupported
by principles of contract construction.’”
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s
Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting News Am. Publications v.
Newark Typographical Union, Local 103,
918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
In reviewing an arbitration award,
courts “do not sit to hear claims of factual
or legal error by an arbitrator as an
appellate court does in reviewing decisions
of lower courts.” Tanoma Mining Co., 896
F.2d at 747 (citing United Paperworkers
Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 37-38
(1987)); see also Mutual Fire, Marine &
Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co.,
868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding
that “[i]t is not this Court’s role . . . to sit
as the [arbitration] panel did and
reexamine the evidence under the guise of
determining whether the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.”).  Rather,
arbitration awards enjoy a strong
presumption of correctness that may be
overcome only in certain limited
circumstances, as described above.
With this standard in mind, we turn
now to the specific claims at issue here.
B.  Arbitrability
In addressing the threshold question
of arbitrability, we first must determine
whether the CBA empowers the Arbitrator
to settle questions of substantive
arbitrability, i.e., “whether a particular
dispute is subject to the parties’
contractual arbitration provision(s).”  Bell
A t l a n t i c -P e n n s y lv a n i a ,  I n c .  v .
Communications Workers of Am., 164
F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1999).   As we have
previously held, “[a]bsent a clear
expression to the contrary in the parties’
contract ,  subs tantive arb itrability
determinations are to be made by a court
and not an arbitrator.” Id. at 200.
Therefore, contract language submitting
the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator
“must be clear and unmistakable.”
PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d
1372, 1379 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).
Here, however, the Leagues
conceded before the District Court that the
issue of arbitrability was properly
11
submitted to the Arbitrator.8  We do not therefore have to decide whether i t was
proper for the Arbitrator to determine
arbitrability, merely whether he ignored
the plain language of the CBA in his
determination of arbitrability.  See
National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 272 F.3d
at 186.  In doing so, we are obliged to give
that decision “the same deference due an
arbitrator’s decision on the merits.”
United Indus. Workers, 987 F.2d at 167.
Thus, the Arbitrator’s determination of
arbitrability must be affirmed “as long as it
‘draws its essence’ from the collective
bargaining agreement.”  Pennsylvania
Power Co. v. Local Union # 272 of the
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO,
886 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1989).  As noted
above, this requires only that the
Arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA be
rationally “derived from the agreement,
viewed in light of its language, its context,
and any other indicia of the parties
intention.”  United Transportation Union
Local 1589, 51 F.3d at 380 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). 
In presenting the issue to the
Arbitrator in their motion to dismiss, the
Leagues contended that the dispute was
not arbitrable because Article VIII of the
CBA gives the League Presidents the
authority, following a hearing, to issue a
“final and binding” decision regarding the
termination of an umpire.9  The MLUA on
     8  In response to the District Court’s
query about its standard of review of the
arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability,
counsel for the Major Leagues
responded:
MR. GANZ:  If there is no
rational – there has to be a
rational basis for the
arbitrator’s determination,
that he had authority, and
that basis must draw its
essence from the collective
bargaining agreement.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So
there has to be a rational
basis for the arbitrator’s
decision that this matter
was subject to arbitration.
MR. GANZ:  Correct,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So it
isn’t just my reading of the
agreement, I have to give
deference to the arbitrator
to that extent?
MR. GANZ:  That’s
correct.  It was for the
arbitrator in the first
instance, certainly, and you
to review that. . . .
Transcript of Oral Argument, November
27, 2001, at pp. 17-18.
     9Article VIII provides in relevant part
in Section A, Tenure:
12
the other hand maintained that the dispute fell within the broad scope of the general
arbitration provision contained in Article
XV of the CBA.10   
Following his review of the text of
Articles VIII and XV, the Arbitrator
denied the Leagues’ motion to dismiss,
ruling instead that, although the first
paragraph of Article VIII A vested
substantial authority in the League
presidents regarding the termination of
umpires, the second paragraph placed two
specific limitations on that authority.  First,
this “substantial authority” was “limited to
issues concerning the ‘merit and skill of
the umpire to perform to Major League
standards’,” and, second, it had to be
exercised without “discrimination or
[1]  In the event an umpire
with five or more years of
service is discharged by a
League President, the
umpire and the
representative of the
Association shall be
entitled to an explanation
of the reasons for his
discharge and the umpire
shall be entitled at his
request to hearing before
the League President at
which time the discharge
shall be subject to full
review and re-examination
by the League president. 
The decision of the League
President after such
hearing shall be final and
binding.  
[2]  All umpires shall be
selected or retained in the
discretion of the League
Presidents on the basis of
merit and the skill of the
umpire to perform to Major
League standards.  With
respect to all such members
of the regular staff, there
shall be no discrimination
or recrimination on the part
of any party to this
Agreement.
(paragraph numbering added).
     10Article XV provides, in relevant
part:
In the event of a dispute
concerning a claimed
violation of the provisions
of this Agreement by either
party thereto the matter
shall be referred to the
League President involved
and a representative of the
Association; and if an
agreement is not reached
by these two individuals
within ten days the matter
shall be referred to an
arbitrator mutually agreed
upon as sole neutral
arbitrator to finally
determine the matter.
13
recrimination.”   In view of this
determination, the Arbitrator concluded
that, “to the extent that the Presidents
terminated or accepted the resignations of
the 22 umpire grievants, as the case may
be, the issue of whether this decision was
an abuse of discretion or was performed in
a discriminatory or recriminatory manner,
is subject to arbitration.”  Rulings
Concerning Employer’s Motion to Dismiss
et al. (Rulings) at 3.  In confirming the
Arbitrator’s decision, the District Court
held that, “because the parties contracted
to arbitrate disputes concerning any
‘claimed violation’ of the Agreement, and
because the current dispute concerning the
selection or retention of umpires is such a
‘claimed violation,’ the arbitrator properly
exercised jurisdiction.”  Major League
Umpires Ass’n v. American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, No. 01-2790,
slip op. at 12 (E.D.Pa . Dec. 13, 2001). 
On appeal, the Leagues contend
that the issue sought to be arbitrated by the
MLUA was whether the Leagues violated
the CBA by “terminating” the twenty-two
umpires in question.  They further assert
that the CBA does not provide for
arbitration of this issue, and that it
therefore is not arbitrable.  Instead, they
argue that, in order to be arbitrable, a
dispute must “concern[] a claimed
violation of the provisions of th[e]
[CBA].” (quoting Article XV of the CBA).
The Leagues urged that Articles VIII and
XV contain two mutually exclusive
dispute resolution mechanisms; because
the MLUA relied primarily upon Article
VIII and the dispute resolution provision
of Article VIII makes no mention of
arbitration or of Article XV, the Arbitrator
should have concluded that there was no
agreement to arbitrate the dispute at issue
here.  
We have reviewed the applicable
provisions of the CBA in light of the
arguments of the parties and see no basis
for vacating the Arbitrator’s finding of
arbitrability.  Although we may question
the clarity of the Arbitrator’s ruling with
respect to this issue, we do not conclude
from the record before us that the
Arbitrator considered the issue before him
to be a simple Article VIII termination of
the umpires.  Rather, in rejecting the
Leagues’ motion to dismiss, the Arbitrator
found the arbitrable issue to be one
involving a determination of relative
“merit and skill” and as well as the
possible abuse of discretion or exercise of
discriminatory or recriminatory animus in
the respective League Presidents’
decisions regarding the “terminat[ion] or
accept[ance] [of] the resignations of the 22
umpire grievants.”  Rulings at 3.  The
reference by the Arbitrator to “merit and
skill” and to “discriminato ry or
recriminatory animus” brings us down to
the second paragraph of Section A of
Article VIII.  It is, however, the first
paragraph of the Section A that speaks of
“final and binding” review by the League
President of umpire discharges.
From the foregoing, we conclude
that the Arbitrator’s initial finding of
arbitrability was premised on alleged
violations of the CBA, involving selection
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of umpire candidates which selection did
not involve merit and skill, and further
premised on the Arbitrator’s determination
that he must consider whether there had
been discriminatory or recriminatory
animus.  He determined that such types of
violations did not fall under the limited
review provision of the first paragraph of
Article VIII A.  By default, then they
would fall within the broad scope of the
general dispute resolution mechanism
contained in Article XV.  Thus, the
Arbitrator’s finding of arbitrability was not
conditioned upon a finding that the reasons
for the terminations required explanation
prior to the exercise of the final and
binding review of the League Presidents,
as provided for in the first paragraph of
Article VIII A.  The review required from
the nature of the alleged violations would
encompass more than the “explanation of
the reasons for . . . discharge” set out there
and would therefore expand beyond the
bounds of the “final and binding” authority
of the League Presidents provided for in
that first paragraph.   In sum, we conclude
that the Arbitrator did not ignore the plain
language of the CBA, see National Ass’n
of Letter Carriers, 272 F.3d at 186, or
demonstrate manifest disregard for the
CBA, see Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
797 F.2d at 165, when he determined that
violations of the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article VIII A were covered
by the arbitrability provisions of Article
XV rather than by the specific review of
discharges provided for in the preceding
first paragraph of Article VIII A.  
This conclusion is reinforced by the
consideration of  the arbitrability issue in
the Arbitrator’s Award.  The Arbitrator
quoted Article XV, the CBA’s general
dispute resolution provision, for the
proposition that “[t]he dispute resolution
language of the agreement gives me the
jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning
‘claimed violations of the provisions of
this agreement,’”and then noted that,
“[w]hile there may be conflicting views
concerning the propriety of the actions
taken by both sides in this case, the sole
question in this case concerns whether the
actions taken were appropriate under the
terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.”  Opinion and Award at 71.  In
this reference to the “terms” of the CBA,
the conclusion is evident that the
Arbitrator is considering not just the
League Presidents’ discharge review
authority of the first paragraph of Article
VIII A but also the “no discrimination or
recrimination” language of the second
paragraph.  From this it follows that the
Arbitrator rationally determined that his
consideration of whether there had been a
violation of the CBA extended beyond a
review of the reasons for discharge of an
umpire by the League President as set out
in the first paragraph of Article VIII A.   
We find further reinforcement of
this conclusion in the fact that the
Arbitrator, in his Award, determined that
the grievant umpires had resigned their
positions, rather than having been
terminated.  For this reason, the Arbitrator
concluded that the “limitations” for
terminated umpires found in Article VIII
A did not apply.  We presume that in
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referring to the “limitations” for
terminated umpires of Article VIII A and
their inapplicability to the case before him,
the Arbitrator had in mind Article VIII A’s
“final and binding” review of umpire
discharges by League Presidents, found in
the first paragraph.
  As noted above, an arb itrator’s
finding of arbitrability draws its essence
from the CBA if it can be rationally
“derived from the agreement, viewed in
light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties’ intention.”
United Transportation Union Local 1589,
51 F.3d at 379-80 (internal quotations
omitted).  Here, the Arbitrator’s denial of
the Leagues’ motion to dismiss was based
on a determination that the question
whether there had been an abuse of
discretion and discrimination and
retaliation was not constrained by the
limitations of the first paragraph of Article
VIII A.  We conclude that such a
determination can rationally be derived
from the CBA.  
Whether, if faced with the initial
determination, we would have come to the
same decision is immaterial.  There is no
basis from which to conclude that the
Arbitrator’s finding of arbitrability fails to
draw its essence from the CBA, as it may
logically be derived from the text of that
agreement.  See Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113.
Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s
confirmation of the Award with respect to
arbitrability.
C.  Detrimental Reliance
Turning then to the merits of the
underlying dispute, we begin with the
Arbitrator’s conclusion that the actions of
the umpires amounted to actual
resignations, as opposed to a mere threat
or notification of future resignations, so
that the Leagues acted properly in hiring
replacements.  The MLUA challenges this
determination, contending that this ruling
amounted to manifest disregard of the law,
was not supported by the record, and failed
to draw its essence from the CBA.  The
MLUA urges that, because no umpire
actually relinquished his position prior to
September 2, no umpire can be said to
have “resigned.”  Thus, because the
umpires did not resign, the Leagues’
refusal to accept the umpires’ rescissions
of their resignations amounted to a
discharge in violation of the CBA.  The
MLUA further claims that there is no
evidence in the record to support the
Leagues’ claims of detrimental reliance.
In response, the Leagues justify
their decision to begin hiring replacement
umpires for the following reasons:  (1) the
inclusion of the phrase “I hereby resign my
employment” in each of the resignation
letters at issue; (2) the demand for
“voluntary termination pay” by each
umpire with more than ten years’ service;
(3) MLUA General Counsel Richard
Phillips’ statements to the media, which
unequivocally indicated that the MLUA
members had resigned and would not
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rescind their resignations;11 (4) the
execution by each resigning umpire of an
employment contract with Professional
Umpire Services, Inc.; and (5) the filing by
the MLUA of an action in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania seeking to
establish the Leagues’ obligation to make
the severance payments required by the
CBA in the event of voluntary termination.
The Leagues assert that on this record the
Arbitrator properly determined that the
Leagues were justified in  hiring
replacement umpires. 
We have reviewed the record below
and find no basis for disturbing the award
with respect to this issue.  Under the
standards of review of arbitration
decisions set out above in Part IV A, the
Arbitrator’s conclusion that the umpires
resigned and that the Leagues were
justified in hiring replacement umpires is
well supported by the facts of record and
for that reason there is no basis for
reversing it.  See Tanoma Mining Co., 896
F.2d at 748.  Simply put, the Arbitrator
considered the MLUA’s arguments and,
based on the facts and his interpretation of
the CBA and applicable law, found that
the letters constituted resignations rather
than notices of intent to resign.  He
therefore concluded that the Leagues acted
appropriately by hiring replacements in
reliance upon these representations.  
The District Court found that this
conclusion “was not a manifest error of
law.”  Slip op. at 13.  We agree.  As noted
above, because “the parties have bargained
for the arbitrator’s decision, it is the
arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the
meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept.”  Tanoma Mining Co.,
896 F.2d at 747 (internal quotation
omitted).  Thus, we will affirm the District
Court’s confirmation of the Award with
respect to this issue.
     11The following exchange between
Phillips and an interviewer from the
television sports channel “ESPN”
provides an example of such statements:
Phillips: There’s not a 
threat to resign.  They have resigned;
they have formally resigned their
positions.  It’s not a threat.  And they
have all signed contracts with a
professional services corporation.  And,
the first thing that they will do is they
will receive the in excess of $15 million
in severance that baseball owes them.
Interviewer: Can the 
resignations be rescinded, and - - - 
Phillips: No.
Interviewer: Can there be 
peace between the umpires and major
league baseball achieved over the next
couple of weeks in some kind of
negotiation?
Phillips: No.
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D.  The Arbitrator’s Application of
Article VIII’s “Merit and Skill” Criteria
The MLUA next challenges the
Arbitrator’s determination concerning the
standards that National League President
Coleman was required to apply in making
his staffing decisions following the
rescission of the remaining resignations on
July 27.  Specifically, in accordance with
the MLUA’s position that the letters
constituted notices of intent to resign
rather than actual resignations, the MLUA
contends that the combination of new hires
and resignation rescissions resulted in a
situation in which the National League
was overstaffed and National League
President Coleman, in determining whom
to retain, should have compared the “merit
and skill” of the rescinding umpires not
only as between those umpires but also as
to the “merit and skill” of the new hires
and that of those umpires who had never
resigned.  The MLUA urges that the
Arbitrator’s countenance of Coleman’s
failure to do so results in a decision which
fails to draw its essence from the CBA.
In support of this argument, the
MLUA analogizes the present situation to
the one that existed in 1979 when its
members refused to execute their
individual employment contracts at the
beginning of the baseball season despite
the existence of a no-strike clause.  There,
the striking umpires were permitted to
return to work once the situation was
resolved.  This resulted in overstaffing, as
replacement umpires had been hired in the
meantime.  The MLUA claims that the
current “merit and skill” language was
inserted into the CBA as a result of the
1979 incident for the express purpose of
preventing the Leagues from trimming the
umpire ranks by taking action against
those who participate in work stoppages. 
In light of the history of the merit
and skill provision, and because National
League President Coleman admitted
during his testimony before the Arbitrator
that he never applied the merit and skill
criteria to either those umpires who never
resigned or those newly hired, the MLUA
argues that his actions violated the plain
language of the CBA.  Further, because
American League President Budig never
applied the merit and skill criteria in the
first instance, the Association asserts that
he too violated the CBA and that the
Award, which the MLUA contends
effectively allows each League to employ
a different decision-making process, fails
to draw its essence from the CBA.  
We again reject the MLUA’s
arguments.  As a preliminary matter, in
view of the unequivocal no-strike clause
contained in the CBA, we find troubling
the assertion that the merit and skill
criteria was inserted in order to protect
striking umpires.  Indeed, if we were to
read Article XIX of the CBA as
prohibiting strikes while Article VIII
nevertheless protects striking umpires, we
would have a very tortured interpretation
of the contract.  
Moreover, even if there were some
arguable merit to the MLUA’s attempt to
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analogize this situation to the job action
taken by its members in 1979, the
Arbitrator rejected its argument with
respect to this issue.  See Opinion and
Award at 88-89.  Instead, he found that,
unlike the situation that existed in 1979,
the 1999 work stoppage at issue here
involved:  (1) the actual severing of the
employment re la tionship  through
resignation; (2) the hiring of permanent
replacements; and (3) no decision by the
League presidents to increase the size of
their respective umpire staffs.  Id.  This
conclusion does not constitute a manifest
disregard for either the CBA or the
applicable law.  See Neward Morning
Ledger, Co., 797 F.2d at 165.  Thus, we
see no basis for disturbing the District
Court’s confirmation of this aspect of the
Award.
E.  The Arbitrator’s Resolution of the
Claims of Individual Umpires
As discussed above, by the time the
remaining thirty-two National League
umpires attempted to rescind their
resignations on July 27, National League
President Coleman, through new hires and
prior resignation rescissions, had already
filled nineteen of the thirty-two vacant
positions.  Because of the limited
vacancies, he had to accept the
resignations of thirteen of the National
League umpires.  He chose to accept the
resignations of the following umpires:
Darling, Hohn, Poncino, Pulli, West, Tata,
Vanover, Davidson, Gregg, Hallion,
Nauert, Dreckman, and Holbrook, all of
whom filed grievances.  In his Award, the
Arbitrator sustained some of the
grievances and denied others.  He ordered
the reinstatement of National League
Umpires Darling, Hohn, Poncino, Pulli,
Tata, West, and Vanover (the Darling
Group), but denied the grievances and
upheld Coleman’s acceptance of the
resignations of Umpires Davidson, Gregg,
and Hallion, (the Davidson Group), as well
as Umpires Nauert, Dreckman, and
Holbrook (the Nauert Group).  The
Leagues now contend that the District
Court erred in confirming the Arbitrator’s
construction and application of Article
VIII in making these determinations. 
Because Coleman elected not to
exercise his discretion to increase the size
of the National League staff, he was forced
to find a method to determine which
nineteen umpires would be permitted to
rescind their resignations and which
thirteen would have their resignations
accepted.  In so doing, he sought input
from the MLUA’s counsel, who simply
insisted that all decisions be made on the
basis of seniority, which would have
guaranteed that all resigning MLUA
members would be rehired and the new
replacement umpires released.  Coleman
rejected this suggestion. 
Without any other guidance for
making such determinations, Coleman
decided to use the merit and skill criteria
from Article VIII A of the CBA to select
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which resignation rescissions to accept.12 
As stated above, in applying this
merit and skill provision to the thirty-two
National League umpires who attempted to
rescind their resignations on July 27,
Coleman accepted only nineteen
rescissions.  The thirteen National League
umpires not permitted to rescind fell into
either the Darling, Davidson, or Nauert
Groups.  
With respect to the Darling and
Nauert Groups, Coleman refused to allow
them to rescind their resignations because
of the limited number of unfilled positions.
However, in refusing to allow the
Davidson Group to rescind their
resignations, Coleman articulated various
reasons why he believed each member of
the group lacked the merit and skill
necessary to perform to Major League
standards. 
After reviewing Coleman’s
decisions to refuse reinstatement, the
Arbitrator upheld him on the Davidson and
Nauert groups but reversed Coleman’s
refusal to rescind the Darling Group’s
resignations.  The primary basis for the
ruling on the Darling Group was the
Arbitrator’s belief that Coleman’s decision
to reject their rescissions was based solely
on the number of available positions, not
on merit or skill, and that this ran afoul of
the terms of Article VIII.  Although the
Arbitrator concluded that the League
President had substantial discretion in
employment decisions regarding the tenure
of umpires, he found that Article VIII
limited this discretion by requiring the
League President’s decision to be based on
the “merit and skill” to perform to Major
League standards.  The Arbitrator
therefore concluded that the discretion
exercised by the League presidents “is not
limitless,” and that such decisions “must
be one[s] that can be reasonably articulated
and related to issues of merit and skill and
not arbitrary or capricious.”  Opinion and
Award at 90.  The Arbitrator therefore
concluded:
I n  r e v i e w in g  t h e se
explanations in light of the
broad discretion given to
League Presidents, it is this
Arbitrator’s view that Mr.
Coleman must articulate an
explanation that has some
relationship to the merit and
skill of that Umpire as well
as the other factors that he
considered.  If Mr. Coleman
was unable to articulate a
basis, then I must conclude
t h a t  h e  a b u s e d  h i s
discretion.  The mere
statement that he had to find
the “numbers” required to
     12  The relevant language in Article
VIII A, paragraph 2, is “[a]ll umpires
shall be selected or retained in the
discretion of the League Presidents on
the basis of merit and the skill of the
umpire to perform to Major League
standards.”  See footnote 9 for the full
text of Article VIII A.  
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fill the positions is an
arbitrary consideration and
must be overruled.
Id. (footnote omitted).    
However, the Arbitrator upheld
Coleman’s decision to refuse to allow the
Davidson Group to rescind because
Coleman articulated a merit- or skill-
related basis for the refusal.  Finally, the
Arbitrator concluded that the members of
the Nauert Group did not have more than
five years experience and thus were not
entitled to the limited protections offered
by Article VIII.  Opinion and Award at 93-
94.
The Leagues challenge the
Arbitrator’s interpretation and application
of Article VIII.  Specifically, the Leagues
contend that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority and that the Award failed to draw
its essence from the CBA in two respects.
First, they read the Award as concluding
that Article VIII is applicable only in
situations involving the selection or
retention of umpires.  They also read the
Award as holding that the umpires at issue
in this case voluntarily resigned and were
not entitled to the protections afforded by
Article VIII.  The Leagues therefore
contend that the Arbitrator’s application of
the Article VIII merit and skill criteria
results in a logical inconsistency. 
Second, the Leagues assert that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review
applied by the Arbitrator to Coleman’s
merit and skill determinations exceeded
his authority and failed to draw its essence
from the CBA.  Simply stated, they allege
the Arbitrator impermissibly created his
own standard of review for merit and skill
determinations out of whole cloth.  In
response, the MLUA contends that a
reviewing court should look only to the
Arbitrator’s Award, and not his reasoning,
in determining whether it draws its essence
from the CBA. 
In reviewing this portion of the
Award, the District Court noted its concern
over the Arbitrator’s determination with
respect to this issue.  The court
nevertheless, citing Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960), and ARCO-Polymers,
Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756 (3d
Cir. 1982), confirmed this portion of the
Award because the court believed binding
precedent prevented it from vacating an
award simply because of the existence of
ambiguity in the Arbitrator’s reasoning.
Although the court noted the confusing
nature of the Award, it ultimately
concluded that the Arbitrator “did interpret
the Agreement and did manifest fidelity to
his proper role as to the National League
umpires to whom he applied the merit and
skill standard of Article VIII A.  Slip op. at
17.  The District Court further noted that,
because it believed the Arbitrator had
reached the proper conclusion, the
reasoning which provided the basis for its
conclusion was irrelevant.
We are in accord with the District
Court’s conclusion that it may not vacate
an award based solely on an ambiguity in
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an arbitrator’s opinion.  See Roadway
Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d
287, 301 (3d Cir. 2001).  However, we
agree with the Leagues’ assertion that the
District Court erred in stating that the
reasoning of the Arbitrator is entirely
irrelevant.  See id. (holding that “a court
may conclude that an arbitrator exceeded
his or her authority when it is obvious
from the written opinion”); Newark
Morning Ledger, 797 F.2d at 167 n.6
(holding that a court is not required “to
disregard what an arbitrator says in order
to justify what the arbitrator does”).
Nevertheless, we do not find this error to
be essential to the court’s resolution of this
matter.  We therefore reject the Leagues’
invitation to use it as a basis for disturbing
the District Court’s confirmation of this
portion of the Award.  At bottom, the
Leagues’ primary contention is that the
Award is inconsistent.  More specifically,
they contend the Arbitrator employed
varying and questionable logic in first
determining that Article VIII did not
govern the dispute because the umpires
had resigned (as opposed to being
terminated), but then nevertheless
requiring National League President
Coleman to employ the Article VIII skill
and merit criteria appropriately and
consistently once he chose to invoke it.  
The Leagues’ argument is
unpersuasive.  Regardless of whether
another interpretation of the CBA would
make more sense, or whether we or the
District Court would reach a different
result if reviewing this case de novo, the
Arbitrator’s reading is logical and clearly
draws its essence from the CBA. 
Simply stated, the Arbitrator’s
interpretation of the CBA was as follows:
(1) Article VIII creates minimal
protections from termination for umpires
with more than five years of service; (2)
because the umpires at issue in this case
resigned, none were entitled to the
protections of Article VIII in the first
instance regardless of the number of years
of service; (3) even though Article VIII
was not directly applicable in this case,
National League President Coleman
invoked it in determining which nineteen
of the thirty-two final resignation
rescissions to accept (a decision that
essentially involved the “selection” of
individuals from among the pool of
resigned umpires, thereby arguably making
the appli cation of A rticle VIII
appropriate); (4) once Article VIII was
invoked, Coleman was required to adhere
to its terms in making his determinations
with respect to which rescissions to accept;
(5) adhering to Article VIII meant
articulating a reason that bore “some
relationship to the merit and skill of th[e]
umpire,” for each decision reached with
respect to the thirteen umpires not
permitted to rescind their letters of
resignation; (6) because Coleman failed to
meet this standard with respect to the
Darling Group, those umpires must be
reinstated; (7) because Coleman did meet
this standard with respect to the Davidson
Group, the grievances of those umpires
were denied; (8) however, because the
Nauert Group failed to qualify for this
protection in the first place, the members
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of that group could essentially be fired at
will.
Although we acknowledge that the
quality of the Arbitrator’s reasoning leaves
something to be desired, we see no basis
for judicial intervention.  The Arbitrator’s
interpretation is discernable, coherent, and
draws its essence from the CBA.  Given
the limited scope of our review, nothing
more is required.  
In closing, we cannot help but note
that, at their core, many of the claims
raised by both sides in this litigation
amount to little more than requests for
judicial review of the merits of the Award.
We reiterate that such review is inimical to
the public policy underlying the limited
role assigned to the federal courts in the
area of arbitration.  See Pennsylvania
Power II, 276 F.3d at 178 (“The rationale
for the court’s limited role is to ensure that
the federal policy of encouraging
arbitration of labor disputes is not
subverted by excessive court intervention
on the merits of an award.”); Remmey v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“Limited judicial review is
necessary to encourage the use of
arbitration as an alternative to formal
litigation . . . . A policy favoring
arbitration would mean little, of course, if
arbitration were merely the prologue to
prolonged litigation.”).  
It is beyond question that arbitration
proceedings are a valuable method of
dispute resolution, as they offer a means
by which parties may obtain a binding
result within a short period of time and at
relatively minimal expense.  See, e.g.,
Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113 (noting “the
congressional policy of promoting speedy,
efficient, and inexpensive resolution of
labor grievances”); Remmey, 32 F.3d at
146 (noting that “the ‘twin goals of
arbitration’” are “‘settling disputes
efficiently and avoiding long and
expensive litigation’”) (quoting Folkways
Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d
108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)).  However, the
possibility of receiving inconsistent or
incorrect rulings without meaningful
appellate review of the merits is one of the
risks such parties must accept when they
choose arbitration over litigation.  Where,
as here, an award that is questionable
nevertheless falls within the broad
discretion granted to arbitrators, it must be
confirmed. 
V.  Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we
will affirm the final judgment of the
District Court.
Becker, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In my view, the dispute that the
Arbitrator, the District Court, and the
majority of this panel go to such lengths to
resolve was never arbitrable in the first
place.  These tribunals are all agreed that
the umpires resigned – a mass resignation
of a significant portion of the bargaining
unit.  None of the umpires was terminated
or discharged.  As I see it, under these
circumstances, there was no violation
either of the basic agreement or of the first
paragraph of Article VIII A that could
trigger the arbitration clause.  Moreover,
even if one were to ignore the fact of the
resignations, the matter would still not be
arbitrable because as I read that clause, it
confers upon the League Presidents the
unfettered (“final and binding”) right to
discharge an umpire with five or more
years of service.13  The language could not
be clearer, and the exercise of conflating
the second paragraph of Article VIII A –
which deals with retention on the basis of
merit or skill, and the proscription against
discrimination or recrimination – with the
first paragraph of Article VIII A does not
carry the day because the first paragraph
deals with a wholly different situation – a
mass resignation.
This result is not changed by the
standard of review.  As I read the record,
Major League Baseball agreed to submit
the question of arbitrability to the
arbitrator while preserving its right to
challenge his determination.  While this
converts our normal de novo standard of
review (of the arbitrability decision) into a
deferential one, see United Indus. Workers
v. Gov’t of V.I., 987 F.2d 162, 167-68 (3d
Cir. 1993), that does not change the result
because, in my opinion, the determination
that the dispute was arbitrable was
manifestly erroneous, and did not draw its
essence from the agreement.  I therefore
respectfully dissent, and would vacate the
judgment of the District Court and remand
with directions to dismiss the complaint.
 1. Any argument based on the five year
clause has dropped out of the case because
the umpires with less than five years
experience have settled.
